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The Provision of Finance to Small Businesses:
Does the Banking Relationship 
Constrain Performance
Christine T. Ennew 
Martin R. Binks
The beneficial economic effects of entrepreneurial activity can only be realised 
if such activity is relatively unconstrained in both product and factor markets, 
finance has been widely identified as a potential constraint on entrepreneurial 
activity due to either debt or equity gaps. However, in terms of externally sup­
plied finance, it is arguably the availability of debt which is of greatest signifi­
cance to most entrepreneurs. Given the inevitable information problems 
associated with the provision of debt finance, the nature of the relationship 
between bank and entrepreneur can be of considerable importance in ensuring 
the appropriate financing decisions are made. This paper examines the link 
between the banking relationship and the extent to which entrepreneurs are 
constrained by financing arrangements. Empirical analysis of the extent to 
which the banking relationship constrains performance suggests that there is no 
significant difference between more and less successful entrepreneurs.
!• INTRODUCTION
Although not restricted to small businesses, much entrepreneurial activity 
is manifested through small firms. This entrepreneurial activity can contrib­
ute to economic growth and development through the generation of jobs 
(Storey & Johnson, 1987), by promoting competition and by facilitating 
economic restructuring (Bolton, 1971). For these positive contributions to 
be realized, it is important that firms are not constrained by imperfections 
in either output markets (Mayes 8c Moir, 1989) or input markets (Binks & 
Vale, 1990), the latter being the main focus of this paper. It has long been 
argued that small size may preclude firms firom access to certain sectors of 
the capital markets, resulting in finance gaps (Macmillan, 1931). Where 
finance gaps exist, potential viable growth may be foregone. Restricted
Christine T Ennew • School of Management 8c Finance, The University of Nottingham, UK. Martin 
R. Binks • Dept of Economics, The University of Nottingham
The Journal of Small Business finance, 4(1): 57-73 Copyright © 1995 by JAI Press Inc.
ISSN: 1057-2287 All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
access to finance is not attributed directly to size; rather it reflects problems 
of asymmetric information. Such information problems are not unique to 
the small firms sector but are considerably more prevalent because of the 
anticipated higher costs of information collection.
The relative costs and benefits of information collection mean that it is 
unlikely that any financing transaction would be conducted under condi­
tions of perfect information. When information is less than perfect some 
firms may suffer from restricted access to finance. However, the more lim­
ited the information available, the greater potential for misallocation of 
funds and the greater the constraints on growth in the small firms sector. In 
addition to cost factors, the extent of information asymmetry or communi­
cation imperfections will be governed to a large extent by the nature of the 
“relationship” between the suppliers and recipients of funds. Since small 
firms rely predominantly on banks for external funds, the potential for 
finance based constraints can be evaluated by some explicit analysis of the 
relationship between banks and small firms. The paper examines this prop­
osition in the context of small firms in the UK. Section II provides an over­
view of factors governing the provision of finance to UK small businesses 
and Section III discusses the problems of asymmetric information and 
examines the extent to which the banking relationship can, in principle, 
ameliorate these problems. A model to test these propositions is presented 
in Section IV while Section V discusses data collection and measurement. 
The results of the empirical analysis are discussed in Section VI and the 
conclusions from the study are presented in Section VII.
II. THE PROVISION OF FINANCE TO SMALL BUSINESSES
The efficient and effective provision of finance to small firms has long been 
recognized as a key factor in ensuring that those firms with genuine growth 
potential can expand and compete and a number of studies have noted a 
positive association between external finance, particularly bank finance, 
and business peformance (Keasey & McGuiness, 1990; Keasey & Watson,
1992). In the UK, successive government sponsored enquiries, including 
the Macmillan, Radcliffe, Bolton and Wilson Committees, have all high­
lighted the problems experienced by small businesses in gaining access to 
debt and equity finance. It is generally accepted that size may preclude 
firms from access to certain sectors of the capital markets, particularly where 
equity finance is concerned. The development of the venture capital market 
and the introduction of the Business Expansion Scheme have improved the 
supply of equity finance to small businesses in the UK, although recent evi­
dence suggests that the equity gap has not been eliminated (Harrison &
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Mason, 1990). Arguably, however, it is in relation to debt that the problem 
of access to finance may be more pressing, since debt is generally identified 
as the most common type of external finance used by small businesses in 
both the UK (Keasey & Matson, 1992) and the US (Scherr, Sugrue, & Ward,
1993). In the UK, access to external equity from venture and development 
capital firms is typically restricted to projects requiring in excess of 
£250,000 while informal sources from Business Angels are still embryonic 
(Mason, Harrison, & Chaloner, 1992). Even in cases where projects are lar- 
geenough to justify venture capital, there is evidence to suggest that a large 
number of small businesses are resistant to external equity participation 
(Binks, Ennew, & Reed, 1992; Cowling, Samuels, & Sugden, 1991; Dow, 
1992). Consequently, small businesses in the UK rely primarily on debt 
finance from the banking sector either in the form of fixed term loans, or 
more commonly, overdraft finance (lines of credit). Where such businesses 
experience difficulties in obtaining debt finance, potential viable growth 
may be foregone. If such difficulties occur with any regularity then they may 
inhibit the positive economic contribution which would be expected from 
the small firms sector.
Difficulties in obtaining debt finance do not refer simply to the fact that 
some firms cannot obtain funds through the banking system. Indeed, we 
should not expect that all projects would automatically be financed. Genu­
ine difficulties occur first, in situations in which a project which is viable and 
profitable at prevailing interest rates is not undertaken because the firm is 
unable to obtain appropriate funding and second, in situations in which 
viable projects can only obtain funding on apparently disadvantageous 
terms. Restricted access to finance is not necessarily attributable directly to 
size, but is instead a result of the problems associated with the availability 
of information on which projects are evaluated (Berger & Udell, 1993; Con- 
stand, Osteryoung, & Nast, 1991; Keasey &: Watson, 1993). Such informa­
tion problems are not imique to the small firms sector, but are considerably 
more prevalent there because of the anticipated higher costs of information 
collection. This paper focuses attention specifically on issues surrounding 
the provision of debt finance although the analysis may be generalized to 
deal with issues relating to the provision of equity finance.
III. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
AND THE BANKING RELATIONSHIP
Information asymmetry poses two problems for the provision of debt 
finance. First, the bank cannot observe ex ante certain information which is 
relevant to the decision to enter into the contract, typically the actual abil­
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ities of the individuals applying for finance and the qualities of the project 
(adverse selection). Second, the risk that the small business will not perform 
in a manner consistent with the contract, necessitates some form of ex post 
monitoring procedure (moral hazard). In principle, information could be 
collected with respect to the abilities of the entrepreneur, the nature of the 
industry, and market and the behavior of the business once finance has been 
made available. In practice, the cost of gathering such information at a sin­
gle point in time is likely to be high, and in most cases prohibitively high, 
relative to the risk and return associated with any given project. Even if a 
comprehensive information set were available, the bank is likely to encoun­
ter difficulties in processing that information, thus limiting its practical use­
fulness. However, during the lifetime of a firms relationship with its bank, 
there exists considerable potential gradually to accumulate information 
(Berger & Udell, 1993; Sharpe, 1989) which might be expected to ease the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
The implications of these information asymmetries for the provision of 
debt finance have been evaluated from a theoretical standpoint in a num­
ber of studies. Thus, for example, in examining capital market failure, 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) identify debt gaps as a result of both adverse selec­
tion and moral hazard problems. The adverse selection effect is analogous 
to that observed in insurance markets and arises because borrowers have 
different degrees of risk attached to their projects. As interest rates rise 
low-risk borrowers (although having viable projects) drop out leaving only 
high-risk borrowers. This is reinforced by the moral hazard problem asso­
ciated with the lender’s inability  ^to monitor the project undertaken; again 
it is shown that as interest rates rise the higher-risk projects will be substi­
tuted for the lower-risk projects, and there will be equilibrium credit ration­
ing (see also Bester & Hellwig, 1989). A contrary view is expressed by de 
Meza and Webb (1987) who identify adverse selection in the presence of dif­
ferent (but unobservable) entrepreneurial abilities as leading to an oversup­
ply of credit rather than a debt gap.
While there is a need for further work to reconcile these views, there is 
evidence to suggest that they may not be mutually exclusive. Berger and 
Udell (1989) a i^ e  that while the macro effects of credit rationing may be 
small, there is evidence to suggest that when credit is rationed to some firms 
it may be more readily available to others. In particular, this result may be 
related to the role of collateral in bonding debt finance. Indeed, fipom a the­
oretical perspective it has been shown that the availability of sufficient col­
lateral can counteract these problems; the low-risk borrowers who leave the 
market in the Stiglitz-Weiss model can signal their status by a willingness to 
offer appropriate levels of collateral, and the taking of collateral by the
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banks can provide an incentive to ensure that the firm will perform to the 
best of its abilities in undertaking the project (Bester, 1987). However, if col­
lateral is in limited supply, debt gaps may still exist. In effect, the informa­
tion costs associated with the evaluation and monitoring of a project may 
prohibit an income gearing or prospects based approach to project evalua­
tion, thus causing the lender to default to a capital gearing approach which 
is contingent upon the availability of sufficient collateral. This collateral 
may be in the form of either personal or business assets. As Dempsey and 
Keasey (1993) note, securitizing loans against appropriate assets (prefera­
bly personal) represents a rational approach for banks in the face of high 
project evaluation costs because it allows good projects to self-select. The 
downside of such approaches may be that valuable projects may be lost in 
instances in which the proposer has inadequate personal collateral. In addi­
tion, the provision of personal collateral in the form of a guarantee or 
house deeds effectively erodes limited liability status and the protection it 
provides. This may be expected to discourage investment at the margin, 
given the additional personal risk it implies.
Small firms may also experience a debt gap because they have insuffi­
cient business collateral. With a capital-gearing approach, a debt gap may 
be more fi-equent in the case of small firms because asset-backed collateral 
must be valued at “carcass value” prices to ensure that the loan is covered 
realistically in the event of default and immediate realisation. Loans for 
specific items of plant and equipment will require more than the current 
resale price of the equipment for full collateral since the depreciation rate 
of the machinery will often be assumed by the bank to surpass that of the 
decline in loan values outstanding in the early periods of repayment.
Thus information problems can produce financial constraints either 
because debt finance is not provided or is only provided on disadvanta­
geous terms. Although perfect information is an unobtainable goal, the 
quantity and quality of information available to a bank will be influenced by 
the nature of the relationship with each business (Berger 8c Udell, 1993). A 
close relationship has the potential to provide the bank with a better under­
standing of the operating environment facing a particular business; a 
clearer picture of the managerial attributes of the owner and a more accu­
rate overview of the prospects for the business. Thus, firom the perspective 
of the bank, the relationship provides the basis for understanding customer 
needs and resources and identifying the most appropriate ways of meeting 
those needs. This relationship is not simply a one way process. An effective 
banking relationship requires a positive contribution from both parties. 
The ability of the bank to meet customer needs requires that the owner/ 
manager provides the bank with appropriate and timely information and is
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receptive to suggestions and advice provided by the bank. The develop­
ment of close working relationships between banks and small businesses has 
often been identified as a weakness of traditional Anglo-Saxon banking sys­
tems (Edwards, 1987; Yao-Su Hu, 1984) and a comparative analysis of 
medium sized enterprises in Germany, France, and the UK lends some sup­
port to this hypothesis (Binks, Ennew, & Reed, 1992). Nevertheless, many 
of the recent developments in the provision of banking services to small 
businesses in the UK have attempted to deal with this weakness, particu­
larly through the introduction of specialist small business account manag­
ers.
In the absence of close working relationships between banks and small 
businesses there remains the potential for finance to constrain entrepre­
neurial activity. In the absence of detailed micro-data of the sort that ideally 
would be supplied to the banks, it is impossible to measure objectively 
either the extent to which businesses are constrained or the extent to which 
viable growth has been lost. However, from the perspective of the owner 
manager, it may not be the real extent of the constraint that is relevant but 
rather the perceived extent of the constraint. Where an owner manager 
perceives his/her business to be constrained by the bank, this may in itself 
be sufficient to act as a disincentive to growth plans.
It is not possible to measure the extent to which finance gaps constrain 
entrepreneurial activity, but the effect of such gaps will tend to be greatest 
on small firms with growth potential, in part because it is here that a close 
relationship with suppliers of finance and a good flow of information are 
particularly important in order to incorporate fiiture income prospects in 
the investment decision. A closer relationship, and consequently more 
accurate inform ation exchange, would ceteris paribus increase the 
income-gearing element of project evaluation and reduce the loan gap. 
This is not a smooth process however, since the collection of information 
over and above simple descriptive statistics causes a discrete and dispropor­
tionately large rise in costs to the financial institution concerned because 
the assessment of more qualitative aspects such as management skills is 
more time consuming to perform and requires a much higher level of 
investment in the training of those undertaldng the evaluation.
IV MODEL SPECIFICATION
As the previous sections have argued, the performance and growth of 
smaller businesses may be constrained by restrictions on access to finance. 
Such restrictions may vary from the limited availability of credit through to 
the availability of credit in insufficient quantities or on inappropriate terms.
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The previous section has discussed the nature of these financial constraints 
and has argued that the source of such constraints lies essentially with prob­
lems of information availability and processing. While recognizing that 
many of these information problems have no realistic solution, it can be 
argued that the nature of the relationship between banks and small busi­
nesses can either ameliorate or exacerbate such problems. Thus the nature 
of the banking relationship can be seen as a crucial element in the provision 
of finance to business in general (Turnbull 8c Gibbs, 1987) and small firms 
in particular (Watson, 1986). A good banking relationship will improve the 
quality and quantity of information flows and thus may be expected to 
reduce the extent to which businesses are or feel constrained by banking 
practices. This does not mean that a good banking relationship leads to the 
acquisition of finance more than a poor banking relationship, but rather 
that in a good banking relationship, the flow of information is such that 
both parties will have a better xmderstanding of each other; banks will make 
more informed decisions and firms will be more aware of the reasoning 
behind those decisions. Thus the firm that is refused access to finance and 
has a good banking relationship may feel less constrained than a counter­
part with a poorer banking relationship since the former should have some 
“ownership” of the decision.
Formally, we suggest that the following model may be employed to 
understand the way in which bank service may constrain a business:
CONSTRAINT = /{Relationship, Product Characteristics, Business Characteristics)
Since the true extent to which a business is constrained by its banking 
relationship cannot be directly measured, the model focuses on the degree 
to which a business is perceived to be constrained. In the absence of any 
clear grounds for selecting functional form, the hypothesized relationships 
are assumed to be linear.
The quality of the banking relationship is expected to reduce the degree 
to which a business feels constrained by the policies of its bank. While there 
is a clear focus on the nature of the banking relationship in this model, the 
potential for other factors to affect the degree to which a business is con­
strained is explicitly recognized. Since most firms will already have some 
bank financing, perceptions of constraints may be affected by the charac­
teristics of the products currently being provided and particularly by the 
interest rate payable, the collateral requirement, and the availability of 
appropriate amounts of debt. Other things being equal, more attractive 
product characteristics should reduce the degree of perceived constraint. 
Fmally, it may be argued that additional firm specific characteristics may
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affect the banking relationship and thus influence perceptions of con­
straints. In particular, age of firm may affect the perceived constraint 
because older firms will have a more established relationship with their 
banks and the banks may be in a position to draw on information generated 
by past lending experiences (Sharpe, 1989). Equally, it can be argued that 
turnover may affect constraints given that the costs of information collec­
tion and processing will tend to be lower as firms get larger. Finally, the per­
formance of a particular business may also affect the perceived degree of 
constraint in that more successfiil businesses may be expected to have a bet­
ter relationship with their bank than less successfiil businesses.
V. DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT
Data used for the empirical analysis were obtained from a survey conducted 
among its members by the Forum of Private Business (FPB) in spring/sum- 
mer 1992 (Binks, Ennew, 8c Reed, 1993). Approximately 16,000 question­
naires were distributed to the entire membership, along with a follow up 
reminder after three weeks. This resulted in 6101 usable responses which 
represents a response rate of 37.5 percent. A comparison of the sample with 
the national population of small businesses reveals some biases. Specifically, 
the sample has a higher than expected proportion of manufacturing firms 
and a lower than expected proportion of agricultural firms and there is 
some bias within the sample towards firms located in the southeast of 
England and away from firms located in the southwest of England. Neither 
of these problems were considered particularly significant. The presence of 
a relatively small number of agricultural firms may actually be desirable 
given the unique nature of the problems facing farming businesses. Simi­
larly, in the context of the UK market, the uneven distribution of respon­
dents between southeast and southwest is unlikely to cause problems 
because there are few grounds for believing that the experiences of these 
two regions would differ significantly.
Respondents to the survey range fk>m very small businesses through to 
those which would be considered as medium rather than small. Thirty per­
cent of firms had a turnover of less than £150,000 per year and the majority 
of these (22%) had a turnover between £50,000 and £150,000, with only 
eight percent reporting a turnover of less than £50,000. Seventeen percent 
reported turnovers between £150,000 and £250,000 and a further 20 per­
cent between £250,000 and £500,000. It is noticeable that 17 percent of 
respondents had turnover in excess of the £ 1,000,000 threshold which is 
sometimes used to define the margin between small and medium sized 
business. Around 47 percent of firms in the sample reported a profit level
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of between zero percent and 10 percent as a percentage of turnover. This 
contrasts with a figure of 40 percent for this profit category in a similar sur­
vey in 1990 (Binks, Ennew, & Reed, 1990). Reasons for this change are 
almost certainly linked to the prevailing recession. Perhaps surprisingly, 
therefore, the proportion of firms reporting profits in excess of 20 percent 
against turnover is almost exactly the same as in 1990, with figures of 29 
percent in the present survey as against 31 percent in 1990. However, aver­
age profit for respondents in the current sample was 16.7 percent, which 
was significantly lower than the 1990 average of 18.2 percent. Such a fall 
was to be expected given recessionary conditions. The fact that the reduc­
tion in profitability is relatively small is likely to be a reflection of the loss 
fipom the sector of a large number of low profit firms.
A high proportion of respondents were experiencing low or negative- 
growth rates, as might be expected given the prevailing economic climate. 
Again this contrasts sharply with the results from a previous survey. In 1990 
only nine percent of firms reported a decline in turnover over the previous 
three years. The corresponding value for 1992 is 48 percent. In 1990, 30 
percent of firms reported growth in excess of 20 percent per annum. The 
corresponding figure for 1992 was 9.4 percent. Firms currently declining or 
growing slowly typically expect to follow similar patterns in the immediate 
fiiture, and it is only among the firms which are currently fast growth that 
there is a substantial expectation of future fast growth. Thus, the basic char­
acteristics of the sample are indicative of a small firms sector which is suf­
fering significantly fi-om the effects of the recession, but within which there 
is evidence of a significant number of firms which are prospering and grow­
ing in spite of prevailing economic conditions.
The survey contained a variety of questions which related to the con­
straints faced by business and the nature of the relationship between busi­
nesses and their banks. These data, along with basic dem ographic 
characteristics and details on financing were used empirically to test the 
model suggested above.
In order to measure the extent to which a business is constrained, 
respondents were required to score seven aspects of bank practice which 
might constrain their business, namely collateral requirements, interest 
rates, availability of credit, bank charges, competence of manager, speed of 
service and term of loan. These items were combined to form a scale which 
measured at an aggregate level, the degree to which respondents believed 
that their business was constrained by banking practice. Each aspect of con­
straint was scored on a scale from l= n o  constraint to 5 = severe constraint; 
summing across all items produced a dependent variable (CONSTRAINT) 
with values in the range 7 to 35. Higher scores on the constraint variable
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indicated that respondents perceived their business to be highly con­
strained by bank practices. Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86 indicated that this 
scale was reliable.
Three specific aspects of the bank-business relationship were measured; 
the importance attached to aspects of bank service, the quality of provision 
and the attributes of bank managers. Each aspect of the relationship was 
measured using a set of multi-item scales. All these items were measured on 
the basis of respondents own perceptions and a list of the scale items is pre­
sented in the Appendix. To identify the underlying dimension for each 
aspect of the relationship, each set of scale items was subject to a factor anal­
ysis using principal components extraction. This resulted in the identifica­
tion of three underlying dimensions for each aspect of the relationship.
The importance aspect of the relationship measured the respondents 
assessments of the importance of particular aspects of bank service. Factor 
analysis suggested that three underlying dimensions were present and 
these three factors accounted for approximately 70 percent ojf variance in 
the original data set. The first (IMPK) measured the importance attached 
to bank knowledge and advice; the second (IMPPE) measured the impor­
tance attached to personalization in the service delivery process and the 
third (IMPPR) measures the importance associated with more specific 
product characteristics such as interest rates, chaises, and range of services. 
For a given quality of provision, respondents who identify certain aspects of 
bank services as important are more likely to feel constrained by the service 
provided than respondents who identify these aspects as less important.
The quality aspect of the relationship was measured using an identical 
set of scale items. Again the factor analysis identified three underlying 
dimensions based on knowledge (ACTK), personalisation (ACTPE)and 
product characteristics (ACTPR). These factors accounted for 74 percent of 
the variance in the original data set. The extent to which respondents per­
ceive their businesses to be constrained is likely to be negatively related to 
their perceptions of the quality of service provided. For each of these six 
variables, higher values are indicative of higher importance and higher 
quality.
Finally the nature of the relationship between the respondent and their 
manager was measured across a range of statements scored on a 5-point 
Likert scale. Factor analysis suggested three underlying factors which 
accounted for 60 percent of the variance in the original data set. The first 
was concerned with the absence of trust and confidence in the relationship 
(BMT) with higher scores being indicative of a lack of trust and confidence. 
The second factor concerned the degree of approachability and equality in 
the relationship (BMA) with higher scores indicating that managers were
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more approachable. The final factor concerned information flows (BMI) 
with higher scores on this factor indicating a reluctance to provide informa­
tion on the part of respondents.
A number of variables were included to describe current financing 
arrangements. Since the number of firms in the sample with overdrafts is 
significantly larger than the number of firms with fixed term loans, the 
characteristics of overdrafts were used as an indicator of current financing 
arrangements. Rate of interest was measured as percentage points above 
base (ROI), and collateral ratios (ODCOL) were measured in relation to 
overdraft limits, with adjustments for outstanding mortgages when the 
owner/managers house represented the collateral. To obtain some indica­
tion of the extent to which the finance provided was adequate, the level of 
overdraft use, calculated as the ratio of amount overdrawn to size of over­
draft limit, was used as a crude indicator (ODUSE), although it is acknowl­
edged that this may also be an indicator of the extent to which any given 
firm is experiencing financial difficulties. Additionally, given the differ­
ences in type of collateral taken, a dummy variable (COLTYPE) was 
included which took a value of one where respondents were required to pro­
vide personal collateral and zero where business or no collateral was 
required. A priori, the decision to take personal collateral, because of its 
implications for limited liability status, might be expected to result in 
respondents feeling that their business is more constrained by bank prac­
tice.
Fmally, four firm-specific characteristics, namely age and size, profit­
ability, and growth rate were identified as potentially influencing the per­
ceived degree of constraint. Age of firm (AGE) entered the model directly 
as a continuous variable as did profitability (PROFIT). Size of business 
(TURNOVER) and rate of growth (GROWTH) entered the model as ordi­
nal variables covering nine size categories and six growth categories respec­
tively.
Age was hypothesized to have a negative effect on the perceived degree 
of constraint as suggested by Sharpe (1989). Similarly size, growth rate, and 
profitability were expected to have negative effects in that the larger more 
successful firms were expected to have better relationships with their banks 
on the grounds that, in an objective sense such firms should be considered 
good risks.
VI. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
The model was estimated using ordinary least squares regression, with the 
basic estimated form as follows:
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CONSTRAINT = F{IMPK{+), IMPPE{+), IM PPR{+), ACTK{-), 
ACTPE{-), ACTPR{-), BM T{+), BMAir),
ODUSE{+), ROI{+), ODCOL{+), COLTYPE (+), 
TURNOVER{-), GROWTH (-) PROFIT {-),AGE (-))
with the signs in parentheses indicating the a priori expectations about the 
direction of the relationship. The dependent variable, although based on a 
simple interval scale, was constructed in such a way that it could take a value 
in the range 7-35. The spread of values was such that this variable could 
effectively be treated as continuous for the purposes of statistical analysis ^  
Visual inspection of the residuals suggested that the linear form was appro­
priate and that neither heteroscedasticity nor non-normality were present.
The unrestricted model specified above contains relationship variables, 
financing variables, and firm specific characteristics. Two further restricted 
models were estimated. In Model 2, it was assumed that the coefficients 
relating to firm specific characteristics were not significantly different fi-om 
zero. Model 3 incorporated the further restriction that the coefficients on 
variables relating to current financing arrangements were also not signifi­
cantly dijBFerent from zero, i^-tests were used to test the acceptability of these 
restrictions. The results for each of these three models are contained in 
Table 1. In both cases, the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to 
zero is rejected; neither set of restrictions is valid and we should focus there­
fore on the unrestricted model.
On the basis of the estimated equations, the extent to which owner/ 
managers believe their business to be constrained by banking practices is 
dependent on the nature of the banking relationship, financing conditions, 
and firm specific characteristics. Specifically, the perceived degree of con­
straint is positively related to assessments of the importance of various 
aspects of bank services and negatively related to assessments of the quality 
of provision of those services. The magnitude of the impact of each of the 
significant variables differs, with knowledge and personalization appearing 
to have a greater weight than product features. In the case of the qualitj^ of 
provision variables, product related aspects appear to be of much greater 
importance than personalization or knowledge variables. Lower levels of 
trust and confidence in the bank manager tend to increase the degree of 
perceived constraint while the approachability of the manager tends to 
reduce the degree of constraint. Higher rates of interest and higher levels 
of overdraft use tend to increase the degree of constraint. Interestingly, the 
sign of the coefficient on the variable measuring collateral ratio is counter 
to what was expected, although the estimated coefficient is not significantiy 
different from zero. The dummy variable for personal collateral is clearly
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Table 1
Unrestricted and Restricted Models (OLS)
Model 1 Model 2 M odels
Coeffici ent T Ratio Coefficient T Ratio Coeffici ent T  Ratio
CONSTANT 17.31 13.83** 16.84 14.27** 20.41 17.79**
IMPK 0.26 9.6** 0.26 9.69** 0.27 10.08**
IMPPR 0.07 1.42 0.06 1.32 0.05 1.09
IMPPE 0.19 5.15** 0.19 4.58** 0.21 6.06**
ACIK -0.15 -4.01** -0.15 -4.08** -0.17 -4.43**
ACTPR -0.35 -7.78** -0.35 -7.63** -0.40 8.63**
ACTTE -0.28 -8.40** -0.29 -8.58** -0.29 8.52**
BMT 0.25 7.75** 0.25 7.88** 0.26 7.97**
BMA -0.26 -5.03** -0.26 -5.05** -0.27 -5.38**
BMI -0.11 -1.59 -0.14 -1.93 -0.16 2.26*
ODUSE 0.49 3.96** 0.49 3.94** — —
ODCOL -0.01 -1.15 -0.01 -1.41 — —
COLTYPE 1.59 7.81** 1.63 8.13** — —
ROI 0.56 5.75** 0.53 5.71** — —
PROFIT -0.02 3.03** — — — —
TURN­ 0.06 1.11 — — — —
OVER
GROWTH -0.10 -1.74 — — — —
AGE -0.01 -2.25* — — — —
R2 0.432 0.428 0.399
F 118.19 P=0.000 151.89 P=0.000 194.55 P=0.000
F (Restrict) 5.37 P=0.000 33.86 P=0.000
N 2620 2620 2620
Notes: *Significant at P = 0.05 
**Sigmficant at P = 0.01
significant and positive indicating that in situations in which entrepreneurs 
are required to provide personal collateral the outcome is likely to be a 
much greater perceived constraint in that business.
Of the firm specific variables, size and growth rates both display the 
expected signs but neither coefficient is significantly different firom zero. 
Profitability and age do appear to affect the perceived degree of constraint. 
As was suggested, older firms with a longer track record and typically a
longer banking relationship tend to be less constrained and similarly, the 
more profitable firms also perceive themselves to be less constrained.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Information asymmetries and transactions costs inevitably mean that the 
bank/small business relationship will occur under conditions of imperfect 
information. Imperfect information is, in turn, one of the main reasons why 
firms face constraints in the market for finance. The nature of the relation­
ship between banks and businesses can affect the extent to which businesses 
are constrained because of its effect on the flow of information. The extent 
to which a business finds itself constrained in relation to access to finance is 
difficult to measure directly although a usefiil indicator can be obtained 
from self assessed degrees of constraint. Using such a measure, this paper 
examined the links between degree of constraint and aspects of the banking 
relationship. Initial results suggest that most dimensions of the banking 
relationship do have a significant impact on the extent to which businesses 
feel constrained. Furthermore, the extent to which these constraints are 
apparent is also related to financing conditions and firm specific character­
istics. Age and profitability tend to reduce the degree to which a constraint 
is perceived to exist, although the taking of personal collateral, high levels 
of overdraft usage, and high interest rates all tend to increase the perceived 
degree of constraint. While this latter result may not be unexpected and 
might in many instances reflect simply the risk-return characteristic of a 
project, the importance of the relationship variables is indicative of the sig­
nificant role played by the less formal aspects of banking in the develop­
ment of a strong entrepreneurial small business sector.
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NOTE
1. A similar approach was adopted by Scherr, Sugrue and Ward (1993) for categorical data 
in the range 1-11. In such situations OLS may result in higher standard errors and thus 
fewer significant results, but the approach is generally deemed to be acceptable on the 
grounds of computational simplicity.
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APPENDIX
_________Scales Used in Measuring the Banking Relationship ______
a) Importance attached to dimensions of the banking relationship.
How important is each of these services to you?
(Ranked on a scale from 1 = not important to 5 = very important).
IMPK
Knows your business 
Understands your industry 
Understands your market 
Offers helpfiil business advice 
IMPPR
Offers wide range of banking services 
Competitive interest rates 
Competitive/predictable charges 
IMPPE
Speed of decision 
Tailors finance to needs to business 
One person deals with all credit needs 
Easy access to loan officer
b) Quality of Service Provision
How well do you think your bank supplies these particular requirements?
(Ranked on a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = very good).
ACTK
Knows your business 
Understands your industry 
Understands your market 
Offers helpful business advice 
ACTPR
Offers wide range of banking services 
Competitive interest rates 
Competitive/predictable charges 
ACTPE
Speed of decision
Tailors finance to needs to business 
One person deals with all credit needs 
Easy access to loan ofiBcer
c) Relationship with Bank Manager
The following statements about the bank/small business relationship were scored on a 
scale from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.
BMT
My bank manager is always available to help in a crisis.
My bank manager often comes forward with positive suggestions to help my business. 
I am confident in the advice I get from my bank manager.
I am confident that my bank understands small businesses.
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I can rely on my bank manager to find ways of meeting my business’s changing finan­
cial needs.
BMA
I prefer to avoid contact with my bank manager.
My bank manager is not really interested in my business.
I feel intimidated when dealing with my bank.
My bank manager is only prepared to offer standard financial small business products. 
BMI
It is important to provide my bank manager with timely and regular management 
information.
It is important to discuss in advance potential excesses over agreed borrowing limits.
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